Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 348495; Unpublished
Judges Boonstra, Markey, and Fort Hood; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff, Aminah Johnson-Jefferson, was domiciled in Georgia, not Michigan, at the time of the subject motor vehicle crash.
Johnson-Jefferson was injured in a motor vehicle crash in Georgia while traveling as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her father, Keith Jefferson. Johnson-Jefferson testified that, at the time of the crash, she was visiting her father in Georgia, but that she lived with her mother, Tracie Johnson, in Michigan. After the crash, Johnson-Jefferson sought no-fault PIP benefits under her mother’s policy with Home-Owners Insurance Company, but Home-Owners denied her claim, alleging that she was domiciled in Georgia, and not wither her mother, at the time of the crash. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary disposition in Home-Owners favor.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Johnson-Jefferson was domiciled in Georgia, and not with her mother, at the time of the subject motor vehicle collision. The Court of Appeals applied the multi-factor tests in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange, 404 Mich 477 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983), and determined that a question of fact existed as to Johnson-Jefferson’s domicile at the time of the collision. The Workman and Dairyland factors, respectively, include:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household[.] [Id., quoting Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497 (citations omitted).]
. . .
(1) the person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or assistance. [Id. at 497 n 41, quoting Dairyland, 123 Mich App at 682.]
Considering these factors, the Court noted that there was conflicting evidence as to Johnson-Jefferson’s domicile at the time of the collision. For instance, Johnson-Jefferson testified that she was only visiting Georgia for two or three weeks, and that she intended to return to Michigan to continue classes at Washtenaw Community College, which she did in fact do after the crash. Conversely, her hospital medical records and the police report from the crash listed a Georgia address as her address; and she signed a letter of relocation informing her employer a day before the crash that she was relocating to Georgia. Her mailing address was in Michigan, however, the majority of her belongings were at her mother’s home in Michigan, and she did not have her own, personal bedroom at the Georgia home. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that “reasonable minds could differ regarding whether plaintiff was domiciled in Georgia or Michigan at the time of the accident.”
