Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 349780; Unpublished
Judges Riordan, O’Brien, and Swartzle; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for summary disposition—in which the defendants, Michael Joseph Schmitt and his employer, Mr. Pizza Ypsilanti, Inc. (Mr. Pizza), argued that no reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff, Destiny Macon, was less than 50% at fault for the subject pedestrian-versus-motor vehicle crash—and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in Schmitt and Mr. Pizza’s favor. The Court of Appeals held that Macon failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Schmitt was negligent when he crashed into her with his vehicle as she attempted to cross the street.
Destiny Macon was struck by a motor vehicle driven by Schmitt as she attempted to cross a five-lane road at an intersection while on a break from work. Schmitt was delivering pizzas at the time of the collision, and testified later that he was traveling in the travel lane at the time of the collision; that the light was green as he entered the intersection. Macon, conversely, testified that Schmitt was driving in the curb lane at the time of the collision, and that, although she did not see what color the light was when she began to cross the intersection, “she thought Schmitt was going fast in order to avoid being stopped at a light.” Schmitt and Mr. Pizza moved for summary disposition, arguing that no reasonable juror could conclude that Macon was less than 50% at-fault for the collision. The trial court disagreed, and denied Schmitt and Mr. Pizza’s motion.
On appeal, Schmitt and Mr. Pizza argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court of Appeals held that Macon failed to meet her burden for opposing a motion for summary disposition, and that she presented only conjecture and speculation in rebutting Schmitt’s account of the collision.
During plaintiff’s deposition, she conceded that she did not see the color of the traffic light when she stepped off the curb into oncoming traffic, but that she believed the light was red because other vehicles were stopped at the intersection. Plaintiff further testified that she did not know how fast Schmitt was driving when the collision occurred, or what the speed limit was in the area. Plaintiff admitted that she had some memory issues, and remembered “a little bit” of what happened. Her initial account of the incidence is recorded in the police report which states that plaintiff told the police that she began crossing the street after the light turned red, and was struck by Schmitt’s vehicle in the curb lane after Schmitt, who was “driving really fast,” ran the red light. The police report further states that Scott told police that he was driving in the travel lane and Schmitt was driving in the curb lane when the collision occurred. However, in light of plaintiff’s deposition testimony that she did not see the traffic light and did not know Schmitt’s speed, plaintiff’s contradicting statements to the police are merely speculation, and as such they are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Libralter Plastics, Inc v Chubb Group of Ins Cos, 199 Mich App 482, 486; 502 NW2d 742 (1993) (parties opposing a motion for summary disposition must present more than conjecture and speculation to meet their burden of providing evidentiary proof establishing a genuine issue of material fact).
