Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 348960; Unpublished
Judges Ronayne Krause, Sawyer, and Boonstra; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Recoupment Between Equal Priority Insurers [§3115(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order for entry of judgment in favor of third-party plaintiff Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, as well as the trial court’s denial of defendant The Hartford Insurance Company’s motion for summary disposition and its summary disposition order in favor of Progressive. The Court of Appeals held, as a matter of law, that plaintiff Carlos Coleman was domiciled with his mother-in-law, The Hartford’s insured, at the time of the subject motor vehicle collision, and that The Hartford and Progressive, the insurer of Coleman’s wife’s vehicle that Coleman was driving at the time of the subject motor vehicle collision, were therefore equal in priority pursuant to MCL 500.3114. Thus, Progressive did have a statutory right to seek recoupment from The Hartford for half the amount it paid to Coleman in no-fault PIP benefits and, furthermore, the Court held that a claim against another insurer in the same order of priority for recoupment of PIP benefits is subject to the six-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 600.5813, not the one-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 500.3145(1) regarding claims for subrogation.
Carlos Coleman was driving his wife’s vehicle when he was involved in a motor vehicle collision, and his wife maintained an automobile insurance policy with Progressive, under which Coleman was listed as a driver. At the time of the collision, however, Coleman was residing with his mother-in-law, who maintained a no-fault insurance policy with The Hartford. Progressive initially paid Coleman’s PIP benefits, and eventually filed a third-party complaint against The Hartford, alleging that both insurers were in the same order of priority and that Progressive was therefore entitled to recoupment of half of the benefits it had paid. The Hartford initially conceded that Coleman was domiciled with his mother-in-law at the time of the collision, but argued that Progressive’s claim for recoupment was actually one for subrogation, and therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 500.3145(1). Ultimately, the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Progressive and The Hartford were in the same order of priority and that Progressive’s action was one for recoupment, not subrogation, and thus subject not to the one-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 500.3145(1), but rather the six-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 600.5813.
On appeal, The Hartford first argued “that MCL 500.3115(2) does not provide a statutory right for recoupment between no-fault insurers of equal priority,” because “‘reading MCL 500.3115(2) in the context of the entirety of MCL 500.3115 makes clear that MCL 500.3115(2) was only intended by the Legislature to apply to insurers equal in priority with respect to pedestrian versus motor vehicle accidents.’” The Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of the statute, holding that “the plain language of the statute specifically provides a statutory right for recoupment between no-fault insurers of equal priority.”
The Hartford next argued that even if it was equal in priority with Progressive, Progressive’s claim for recoupment was one of common-law subrogation and therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 500.3145(1). The Court of Appeals rejected this argument as well, relying on its prior decision in Titan Ins Co v Farmer’s Ins Exchange, 241 Mich App 258 (2000), in which the Court of Appeals held that such actions—seeking recoupment for PIP benefits from another insurer of equal priority—are subject not to the one-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 500.3145, but rather six-year statute of limitations period provided for in MCL 600.5813. The Court analogized this case to Titan as follows:
In Titan Ins Co, 241 Mich App at 260-261, the plaintiff, a no-fault insurer, sought recoupment of benefits paid to the insured from the defendant, a no-fault insurer in the same order of priority as the plaintiff. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff’s claim for recoupment was barred by the one-year statute of limitation in MCL 500.3145. Id. This Court disagreed, stating:
While we recognize that plaintiff’s claim falls within the no-fault act, we disagree with defendant that because plaintiff seeks reimbursement under the act, its claim automatically falls within the period of limitation provided for in subsection 3145(1). We turn first to the language of subsection 3115(2) and note that it provides a specific right of partial recoupment by one no-fault insurer of PIP benefits paid by another no-fault insurer of the same order of priority, independent of an accident victim’s right to payment of PIP benefits. Thus, this case is distinguishable from those in which an insurer’s right to recovery or reimbursement from another insurer was found to be subrogated to the insured’s right to recovery and therefore subject to the period of limitation in § 3145. [Id. at 261-262.]
