Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 342652; Published
Judges Kelly, Tukel, and Redford; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Dependents [§3108(1)]
Children as Dependents [§3110(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s action for survivor’s loss benefits, finding that the plaintiff was not a dependent of the decedent. Although the plaintiff did live with and receive regular support from the decedent, she was over 18 and employed full-time at the time of the decedent’s death, and continued to work for some time thereafter. The plaintiff argued that she was a dependent, nonetheless, because her lack of education and work experience rendered her physically and mentally “incapacitated” from earning. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiff’s interpretation of the term “incapacitated,” holding that, although the plaintiff was impacted by the decedent’s death, the decedent’s death did not affect the plaintiff’s physical or mental capacity to earn.
The plaintiff’s mother passed away in a motor vehicle collision and left no assets to her surviving children other than a bank account where her Social Security Supplemental Income benefits were deposited every month. The plaintiff, herself, had only ever worked in the food industry, never graduated high school, and never received any form of professional work training. Just prior to the collision, the plaintiff and her two children moved into her mother’s home, while the plaintiff worked at a nearby fast-food establishment. The plaintiff and her mother pooled the SSI benefits and the plaintiff’s income to pay for rent, utilities, and groceries, and the plaintiff’s mother also helped to cook, clean, and run errands.
After the plaintiff’s mother died, the plaintiff struggled to find babysitters to care for her children while she worked, and she eventually lost her job because of “childcare issues.” The plaintiff applied for survivor’s loss benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, and the MACP assigned her claim to State Farm. State Farm refused to pay survivor’s loss benefits to the plaintiff, arguing that the plaintiff did not qualify as a dependent of the decedent. In the plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit, State Farm moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of State Farm, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that, although she was over 18 years old, her lack of education and work experience rendered her physically and mentally incapacitated on earning. The plaintiff was over 18 years old and employed full-time at the time of her mother’s death. Moreover, she continued to work for some time thereafter. Thus, “although the plaintiff’s ability to work full-time was impacted by the decedent’s death because of childcare issues, her physical and mental capacity to earn was not.”
Plaintiff submits that she qualifies as a dependent of the decedent even though she is over 18 years old because she lived with the decedent, received regular support from the decedent, and her lack of education and work experience rendered her physically and mentally incapacitated from earning. MCL 500.3110 does not define the term “incapacitated.” Although an undefined statutory term must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a dictionary may be consulted “to define a common word or phrase that lacks a unique legal meaning.” Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 276; 753 NW2d 207 (2008).
“Incapacitated” is defined as “[s]omeone who is impaired by an intoxicant, by mental illness or deficiency, or by physical illness or disability to the extent that personal decision-making is impossible.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed). “Incapacitated” is also defined as “deprived of strength or power; debilitated.” New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed). These definitions indicate that one is physically or mentally incapacitated from earning if she suffers from an affliction that makes it impossible to earn.
The trial court properly concluded that a question of fact was not presented regarding plaintiff’s status as a dependent. Plaintiff is not entitled to the conclusive presumption of MCL 500.3110(1)(c) because she is over 18 years old, was working full-time at the time of the decedent’s death, and continued to work for some time thereafter. Plaintiff’s lack of formal education and minimal work experience did not prevent her from working full-time. Although plaintiff’s ability to work full-time was impacted by the decedent’s death because of childcare issues, her physical and mental capacity to earn was not. Moreover, neither MCL 500.3110(1)(c) nor (2) address the extent to which one must be capable of earning; they only address the capacity to earn at all. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish a question of material fact as to whether she is a presumptive dependent of the decedent under MCL 500.3110(1)(c) or a dependent in accordance with MCL 500.3110(2) because she was not physically or mentally incapacitated from earning.
The Court also distinguished this case from Vovak v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exc.h, 98 Mich. App. 81 (1980), upon which the plaintiff relied. In Vovak, the Court of Appeals held that a decedent’s parents were dependent on their son who was killed in a motor vehicle collision. The son lived with his parents and contributed to their household expenses every week, and neither parent was employed full-time. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Vovak is not binding on this court, and distinguishable in that the plaintiff in this case was employed full-time at the time of her mother’s death.
