Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 342594; Published
Judges Letica, Kelly, and Boonstra; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary disposition seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s first-party action for no-fault PIP benefits, because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the subject motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff was injured after a motor vehicle collided with a bus he was traveling on, which was owned and self-insured by the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART). Around the time of the collision, the plaintiff had been living periodically with both his girlfriend and sister, the latter of which had a policy of no-fault automobile insurance through GEICO. The Court of Appeals determined that a question of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was living with his sister at the time of the collision, in which case GEICO would be highest in priority for purposes of paying no-fault PIP benefits.
After the subject collision, the plaintiff filed a complaint against SMART to recover no-fault PIP benefits. The defendant moved the trial court to add third-party defendant GEICO as a necessary party, arguing that the plaintiff was domiciled with a GEICO insured, the plaintiff’s sister, at the time of the collision, thereby making GEICO the highest priority insurer. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to add a claim against GEICO for breach of contract. Both GEICO and SMART moved for summary disposition, and the claim against GEICO was dismissed because the trial court found that any claims against it would be barred by the one-year back rule. SMART’s motion was denied, meanwhile, because “the evidence established that there was a dispute as to whether plaintiff was domiciled with [his] sister at the time of the accident, and that plaintiff’s domicile was, therefore, a question of fact for the jury.”
The Court of Appeals highlighted the following facts regarding the plaintiff’s living situation at the time of the collision:
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was “kind of homeless” at the time of the accident. He stated that although he had periodically lived with his sister, Julia Smith, for several years, he had been staying with his girlfriend, Barbara Bailey, at the time of the accident and only started living again with Smith after the accident; however, during the same deposition, plaintiff also answered “yes” when he was asked whether he was living with Smith at the time of the accident. Plaintiff’s employer had both Smith’s and Bailey’s addresses on file for plaintiff. Most of plaintiff’s mail went to Smith’s address, but his paychecks were sent to Bailey’s address. Plaintiff’s state identification card listed Smith’s address. Smith testified that plaintiff would periodically live with her, but that he was not living with her on the date of the accident; yet plaintiff was “always welcome” at Smith’s home. Plaintiff stored clothing in Smith’s garage and would stay in a spare bedroom when he stayed with Smith.
In affirming the trial court’s denial of SMART’s motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals relied on the four factors for determining domicile laid out in Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch., 404 Mich. 477 (1979), and an additional five factors laid out in Dairyland Ins. Co. v Auto Owners Ins. Co., 123 Mich App 675 (1983). Those actors are as follows:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his “domicile” or “household” (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household (3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises, (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. [Citations omitted.]
. . .
(1) the person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or assistance. [Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993), citing Dobson v Maki, 184 Mich App 244, 252; 457 NW2d 132 (1990), and Dairyland, 123 Mich App at 682.]
In light of all these factors, the Court of Appeals determined that a question of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was domiciled with his sister, GEICO’s insured, at the time of the collision.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Lockwood, 323 Mich App at 401, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the accident. Some factors weigh in favor of finding that plaintiff was domiciled with Smith at the time of the accident, while other factors weigh against that finding. Because domicile is generally a question for the jury when there is a factual dispute, Grange, 494 Mich at 490, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
