Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 340564; Unpublished
Judges Meter, Jansen, and Kelly; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s first-party action to recover no-fault PIP benefits, specifically wage-loss and replacement services benefits. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her injuries left her unable to work and in need of replacement services.
The plaintiff, Ruby Seifuddin, filed a lawsuit against her automobile insurer, Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company, in 2016, for wage-loss and replacement services benefits related to injuries she sustained in a 2013 motor vehicle collision. The trial court initially determined that her claims were barred, in part, by the one-year-back rule, but ultimately determined that all her claims were barred because she did not provide any medical records to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding her inability to work and her need for replacement services. To support her claim, the plaintiff relied principally on her own affidavit stating that she could no longer work, as well as a letter from a doctor in which he said he was treating her for “joint pain that is related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2015.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Esurance, first rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court violated her due-process rights when it dismissed her case sua sponte. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s case sua sponte at all; rather, it dismissed the plaintiff’s case after the defendant orally renewed its motion seeking dismissal of the case—which it originally sought on the basis of the one-year-back rule and because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that her injuries disabled her from working—at a settlement conference. The plaintiff argued, however, that her lack of notice argument referred to an alleged lack of notice that the evidentiary issues would be litigated at the settlement conference, not just the issue of the one-year-back rule. The Court found this argument unpersuasive.
First, we conclude that the trial court did not dismiss the case sua sponte. Instead, defendant orally renewed its motion seeking dismissal of the case because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of her claims that she was unable to work and that she needed help with household services. Defendant’s earlier motion for summary disposition concentrated on the argument that plaintiff’s claims for work-loss and replacement-services benefits were barred because of the one-year-back rule. In addition, defendant’s motion for summary disposition also stated: “Plaintiff testified that she has not sought any treatment for any injuries allegedly sustained in the subject accident, since June or July 2014.” In plaintiff’s response in opposition to that motion, she stated that she had been unable to work since the accident, she was still disabled from working, and she was still in treatment for her injuries from the accident. Therefore, defendant’s oral request to renew its motion for summary disposition because plaintiff had failed to provide evidence of his claims was entirely consistent with its earlier-filed motion that the trial court granted in part.
Plaintiff’s argument regarding a lack of notice refers to a lack of notice that the issue would be litigated at the settlement conference, rather than a lack of notice that the evidence supporting her claims of disability and inability to work were disputed. Although plaintiff was not afforded notice that the issue would be litigated at the settlement conference, plaintiff certainly had notice that her disability and inability to work were at issue generally. Reviewing defendant’s motion for summary disposition and plaintiff’s response to the motion, we conclude that plaintiff had notice that the evidence supporting her assertions that she was disabled and unable to work were at issue.
The Court further concluded that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her injuries left her unable to work and in need of replacement services. The only evidence presented by the plaintiff in this regard were her own deposition testimony and affidavit. The Court pointed out that, as a layperson, the plaintiff could not properly come to the medical conclusion that she could not work. The plaintiff also submitted the aforementioned letter from her doctor and a disability prescription from 2014. The Court noted, however, that the letter from her doctor only confirmed her injuries, and did not speak to whether they disabled her from work, and that, since her claims for work-loss benefits were only from the period of June 23, 2015, through November 30, 2016, her disability prescription from 2014 was not relevant.
