Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 311611; Unpublished
Judges Owens, Stephens, and Boonstra; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Release and Settlements
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the Plaintiff’s claims for a modified van were barred by a previously-executed release agreement, because the unambiguous language of the agreement clearly contemplated Plaintiff’s claim for a modified van.
The Plaintiff was injured in an accident and suffered injuries including the "loss of her right leg." She later filed an action against Defendant Westfield seeking to recover no-fault benefits that "she claimed defendant had denied." The suit was eventually settled and the parties executed a release agreement containing the following clause:
[Plaintiff] does hereby forever release and discharge any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, and other rights which she may have or conceive herself to have against [defendant] that exist and/or are pending as of the date of the signing of this AGREEMENT, based upon or arising out of [the accident].
After executing the release, the Plaintiff filed a second suit arguing that her claim for a van was not barred by the release because "she 'never had any ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ referenced in the [settlement], and her right to claim [the Dodge/Chrysler] could not have been waived." The Plaintiff further argued that "her present claim for a van arose from a 2004 Ford Van, which she purchased after the settlement was entered and the settlement did not waive her right to recover funds for that purchase." However, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held that the scope of the settlement agreement unambiguously barred Plaintiff's claim for a modified van.
In so holding, the court first noted that the "plaintiff made numerous pre-settlement requests for money for a van. 'For example, plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories made a request for money for a '[m]odified [a]ccessible [v]an.' . . . plaintiff also produced a . . . doctor’s prescription for a modified van, and cost estimates for the purchase of a modified van. . . . Indeed, in plaintiff’s own case evaluation summary, plaintiff conceded that 'a claim has been made for an accessible van, which costs $40,000.00.' At her deposition, prior to the execution of the settlement, plaintiff testified that she sought payment for the van from defendant." The Court then found that the plaintiff's pre-settlement demands constituted "demands" made under the belief that the plaintiff had a "right" to recover funds for a van. The Court explained:
These pre-settlement actions are “demands” under the plain definition of the term; moreover, these requests were made due to plaintiff’s belief that she had a contractual right to recover funds for the van consistent with the common definition of the term “right.” Plaintiff made her demands before, and believed she had the right to recover funds for the van prior to, the settlement contract’s execution. In light of the contract release’s use of the term “all,” plaintiff’s demand for van funds and her belief that the contract entitled her to those funds, was discharged by her agreeing to the terms of the settlement agreement. Indeed, the record reflects that plaintiff “demand[ed]” or at minimum “conceive[d] herself to have “the “right[]” to a van before the settlement entered.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concluded that the "plaintiff’s desire for a van was accounted for by the settlement agreement, and plaintiff waived her right to recover additional funds for a van as part of the settlement agreement."
