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Wills v State Farm Insurance Company; (MSC-PUB, 4/30/1991; RB #1462)

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Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 85807; Published 
Opinion by Justice Cavanagh; 3-2 (with Justices Brickley and Levin Dissenting) 
Official Michigan Reporter Citation:  437 Mich 205; Link to Opinion alt   


STATUTORY INDEXING:  
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)] 
Exception for Unreasonably Parked Vehicles [§3106(1)(a)]

TOPICAL INDEXING: 
Legislative Purpose and Intent   


CASE SUMMARY:  
In an Opinion by Chief Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Boyle, with Riley and Griffin concurring separately and Brickley and Levin dissenting, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that where the facts are undisputed, the determination of whether an automobile is parked in such a way as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily injury within the meaning of the parked vehicle exception contained in §3106(1) (a) is an issue of statutory construction for the court.  

The facts of this case involved an automobile which was parked along the shoulder of M-19 facing oncoming traffic with its lights off. The plaintiff’s husband was a passenger on a snowmobile which was unlawfully traveling along the shoulder of M-19 and which struck the unoccupied automobile.  

Chief Justice Cavanagh distinguished the court's earlier opinion in DiFranco v Pickard (Item No. 978) and stated that the issue of whether or not a vehicle is unreasonably parked for purposes of §3106(1) (a) is an issue that is best resolved by the trial judge as a matter of statutory construction rather than as a question of fact to be resolved by a jury. However, Chief Justice Cavanagh's opinion was qualified in the following passage:

"Use of the phrase 'unreasonable risk' in the parking exception appears, at first blush, to create a question of fact But where the facts are undisputed and the complainant is relying on a violation of a statute to establish that unreasonableness, it is a question of law for the court. The definition of proper parking techniques is provided by parking statutes and local parking ordinances. The court, as a matter of law, then applies those statutes and ordinances."

Chief Justice Cavanagh then went on to examine the parking statute that was allegedly violated in this case (MCLA 257.694), which requires vehicles parked on a highway to display lights. The Chief Justice stated that even if this statute was violated, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover benefits because the plaintiff was not in the class of citizens intended to be protected by this particular statute. In this regard, Chief Justice Cavanagh stated:

"On the basis of these facts, even if the court were to hold that the automobile was parked in violation of a statute, the plaintiff could not prevail because the plaintiff’s decedent was not in the class of plaintiffs sought to be protected by the lighted vehicle statute. In view of the purpose behind the lighted vehicle statute, the plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable risk by virtue of a statutory violation must fail.”  "In applying the parking regulations, the court must establish that the statutory purpose doctrine is satisfied. The court can then determine whether the statute was intended to protect the person injured and to prevent the harm suffered. The statutory purpose doctrine remains unfulfilled on these facts. The lighted vehicle statute was designed to protect the safety of other vehicles traveling on a roadway… A passenger on a snowmobile, traveling unlawfully on the shoulder of a highway, is not in the class of persons intended to be protected by the lighted vehicle statute…The parking exception in the no-fault statute does not say 'unlawfully parked' and, therefore, mere demonstration of a statute violation is not enough to satisfy the parking exception. There may be situations where an automobile is illegally parked, as, for example, in a handicapped parking space, but this status as an illegally parked vehicle would not be sufficient to determine that the vehicle was 'unreasonably parked' for purposes of no-fault liability…We conclude that it is not unreasonable to park a vehicle without regard to the protection of persons who may not legally be on the shoulder where the vehicle is parked. The trial court in this case correctly determined that the vehicle was not unreasonably parked. It was completely off the roadway, it was not impeding traffic flow, and it was plainly visible."

Justice Riley and Justice Griffin concurred with Chief Justice Cavanagh's opinion, except that portion which reaffirmed the majority opinion in DiFranco v Pickard. Justice Brickley, joined by Justice Levin, dissented on the basis that summary disposition would not be proper in this case because plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the lighted vehicle statute. As such, Justice Brickley would remand for redetermination of whether the automobile was parked in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of the bodily injury that in fact occurred, in light of the inference of unreasonableness resulting from a statutory violation and in light of the statutory prohibition regarding a snowmobiler's presence on the shoulder of the highway.  


Michigan auto accident attorney Stephen Sinas is the lead editor of the appellate case summaries published on this site regarding the Michigan auto insurance law. To learn more about how Stephen Sinas and how the Sinas Dramis Law Firm can help you if you have been injured in a Michigan auto accident, visit SinasDramis.com.

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