Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 157870; Published
Judges MacKenzie, Griffin, and Neff; Unanimous; Opinion by Judge Griffin
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 213 Mich App 114; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of / Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
Scope of Mandated Coverages [§3131(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published Opinion by Judge Griffin, the Court of Appeals adopted definitive causation standards to be utilized in determining the scope and extent of automobile liability insurance coverage, written under the purview of §3131.
This case involved a dog bite injury sustained inside an automobile. The victim was bitten by the animal when she reached into the car where the dog was seated. The issue was whether the victim's injury was covered under the dog owner's automobile liability policy or a homeowner's liability coverage. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that the injury was covered under the automobile liability policy, and held that the homeowner's insurer was responsible for indemnifying the loss.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that there was an apparent conflict in Michigan law regarding the causation standard that should apply with respect to automobile liability coverage. On the one hand, there is the case of Thornton v Allstate, 425 Mich 643 (1986) [Item No. 935], where the Michigan Supreme Court followed the causation standard utilized in the pre-no-fault residual liability case of Kangas v Aetna Casualty, 64 Mich App 1 (1975), and held that for the recovery of PIP benefits, there must be more than a but for, incidental, or fortuitous connection between the damages sustained and the use of a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court in Thornton applied the Kangas causation standard, despite the fact that the PIP no-fault provision contains an additional qualifying phrase that the use of a motor vehicle be "as a motor vehicle." This panel of the Court of Appeals reads Thornton as applying the same causation standard to PIP and residual liability cases. The court then contrasted the Thornton standard with the standard adopted in Michigan Mutual Liability Company v Ohio Casualty, 123 Mich App 688 (1983), wherein the Michigan Court of Appeals construed the phrase "arising out of the ownership, operation,'maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" in an automobile liability policy as meaning "originating from, or growing out of, or flowing from the use of the automobile." The Court of Appeals then went on to state that most cases in Michigan since Thornton have disregarded the Michigan Mutual case, resulting in a situation where:
"The majority of our decisions follow the Thornton/Kangas causation standard for coverage issues involving residual liability, personal protection insurance or property protection insurance benefits To the extent Michigan Mutual is inconsistent with the causation standard of Thornton/Kangas, we consider it overruled."
The court then further defined the Thornton/Kangas standard by adopting the three-part test for the determination of liability coverages set forth in 6B Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Buckley ED), §4317, page 367-369, wherein the commentator formulated the following standard:
(1) the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the automobile, as such;
(2) the accident must have arisen within the natural territorial limits of an automobile, and the actual use, loading, or unloading must not have terminated;
(3) the automobile must not merely contribute to cause the condition which produces the injury, but must, itself, produce the injury. Upon concluding that the three-part Appleman test is consistent with the Thornton/Kangas standard, the majority stated, "we hereby adopt it as our own." Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court and stated that the dog bite injury here did not satisfy the Thornton/Kangas standard because the automobile "was the mere situs of the injury." As such, the relationship between the injury and the automobile was, at most, merely but for, incidental and fortuitous.
