Michigan Supreme Court; Docket #151026; Published Order
Justices Young, Markman, McCormack, Viviano, Zahra, Bernstein, and Larsen; Unanimous Order
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Order 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of/Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Transportational Function Requirement [§3105(1)]
Allowable Expenses: Incurred Expense Requirement [§3107(1)(a)]
One-Year-Back Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
ORDER SUMMARY:
In this unanimous Michigan Supreme Court Order, the Court denied leave to appeal in a case involving a child who fell and sustained injuries on a school bus while suffering an epileptic seizure. Prior to the issuance of this Order, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished unanimous per curiam Opinion, issued several holdings regarding plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits:
1) A question of fact existed about whether the child’s injuries “arose out of” the use and operation of the school bus as a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3105(1), because there was sufficient evidence that the child’s injury occurred on the bus, which was moving and was transporting the child to school.
2) Amounts owed for medical treatment rendered to the child constituted an “incurred” expense, even though another insurer mistakenly paid the expense, because the amounts were incurred at the time medical treatment was accepted and provided.
3) The intervening plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because the action had already commenced and was “successful” at the time the plaintiffs sought to intervene.
4) A health insurer’s claim was not barred by the one-year-back rule because the health insurer was subrogated to plaintiff’s claim.
On November 13, 2015, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and, in doing so, concluded the trial court applied the wrong causation standard. However, the Court nonetheless determined that the ultimate disposition was proper, given the fact that the jury was properly instructed. In this regard, the Court said:
“On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 30, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. The Court of Appeals erred by relying on the “almost any causal connection” standard of Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 278 Mich App 578, 586 (2008). The ‘almost-any’ standard is discredited and inconsistent with current law to the extent it suggests a plaintiff may meet the statutory causation requirement without proving the causal connection was ‘more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for.’ See McPherson v McPherson, 493 Mich 294, 299 (2013). However, denial is warranted because the trial court correctly instructed the jury that under MCL 500.3105(1), the plaintiff had to prove the causal connection between the injury and the use of the motor vehicle was ‘more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for.’ See Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 646 (1986).”