State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co v Farm Bureau General Ins Co of Michigan; (COA-UNP, 5/19/2015; RB #3426)

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Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #321539; Unpublished  
Judges Beckering, Markey, and Shapiro; Unanimous; Per Curiam  
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion   


STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
Non-Occupant Priority [§3115]

TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable 


CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that a jury properly found the claimant had completed the process of “alighting from” his vehicle within the meaning of MCL 500.3106(1) at the time he was injured, and therefore Farm Bureau was liable for PIP benefits.

The claimant in this case was an elderly man who was injured after alighting from an uninsured vehicle. The injuries occurred when a second vehicle struck the vehicle that claimant had just alighted from. The claimant sought PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility, which assigned the claim to plaintiff State Farm. State Farm claimed it was not responsible for benefits under MCL 500.3115 because, at the time of the injury, the claimant had finished alighting from the vehicle, and therefore defendant Farm Bureau was responsible as the striking vehicle’s insurer. A jury concluded that claimant had finished the process of alighting from the vehicle when he was injured, and a declaratory judgment was entered in favor of State Farm.

The central issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the jury properly determined that the claimant had completely alighted from the vehicle at the time of his injury, thereby making Farm Bureau liable for benefits. The court held the jury properly reached this conclusion.

In this regard, the Court of Appeals said:

“[The claimant’s] testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that he had completed the process of alighting, i.e., had ‘effectively descended from a vehicle and has come to rest — when one has successfully transferred full control of one’s movement from reliance upon the vehicle to one’s body [or in this case, one’s walker].’ … Given [this] testimony, our deference to the jury in evaluating witness credibility, and the requirement to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, i.e., plaintiff, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying [Farm Bureau’s] motion for JNOV.”

The Court of Appeals concluded:

“The application of this definition encompassed defendant’s arguments regarding whether Petree had transferred control of his body to his walker, i.e., away from Bolton’s vehicle. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions … and … there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that Petree had completed the process of alighting under the applicable definition.”