Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 78-2691; Published
Judges Beasley, Gillis, and Ransom; 2-1; Opinion by Judge Beasley
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 93 Mich App 50; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
Determination of Involved Vehicle [§3113]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In a 2-1 decision by Judge Beasley, the Court of Appeals held that the owner of an uninsured automobile was not entitled to receive no-fault benefits under §3113(b) when he was struck by another automobile while pumping gasoline into his car. The Court held that the plaintiff’s car was "involved" as that word is used in §3113(b) and thus, plaintiff was statutorily disqualified from recovering no-fault benefits.
The Court recognized that there were no Michigan cases which construed the meaning of "involved" as that term is used in the no-fault statute. The Court cited a lengthy definition from an English language dictionary which indicated that the word involved means "to combine inextricably." Utilizing this concept, the Court stated, "In putting gasoline into one's automobile and being injured during this procedure, the car one was servicing, because of the close proximity and association with the insured's vehicle, would be 'involved' within the meaning of the statute."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that plaintiff’s injuries arose out of a parked vehicle situation and fall within the contemplation of §3106(b). This section provides that where a motor vehicle is parked, an injury arises out of the "ownership, operation, maintenance or use" of the motor vehicle where the injury was a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be considered a pedestrian. Therefore, because of the above considerations, the plaintiff’s vehicle should be considered to be "involved" within the meaning of the disqualification provisions of §3113(b).
Judge Ransom filed a dissenting opinion. He reasoned that whether or not the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the "ownership, operation, maintenance or use" of a motor vehicle as provided in §3106(b) thus entitling him to receive benefits had he carried the requisite insurance coverage, should not necessarily control in determining whether the plaintiff’s vehicle was "involved" in the accident for purposes of determining whether or not the plaintiff should be disqualified from receiving those benefits where he had not carried the requisite insurance coverage. Judge Ransom noted that the no-fault statute is remedial in nature and, as a result, should be liberally construed. Thus, even though a liberal construction is in order in determining whether or not an injury arises out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, such a liberal construction should not be employed to determine if an uninsured vehicle is "involved" in an accident for purposes of excluding an injured person from no-fault coverage.