Maday v Fireman's Fund Insurance Company; (COA-UNP, 3/27/1989; RB #1250)

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Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 98343; Unpublished  
Judges Kelly, Doctoroff, and Cavanagh; Unanimous; Per Curiam    
Official Michigan Reporter Citation:  Not Applicable; Link to Opinion alt    


STATUTORY INDEXING:  
Exclusion for Parked Vehicles Covered By Workers Comp [§3106(2)]

TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
Workers Disability Compensation Act (MCL 418.1, et seq.)   


CASE SUMMARY:  
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court entry of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff in a case involving the interpretation of the "loading/unloading" language of §3106(2).

Plaintiff Mayday, while in the course of his employment, was assisting in the loading of a truck. While standing inside the truck, plaintiff was directing a hi-lo which was loading crates onto the truck. The truck was parked. A crate slipped from the hi-lo, pinning plaintiffs hand against another crate. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. This case involved his claim for coordinated benefits under the No-Fault Act.

In interpreting the provisions of §3106(2) as they were in effect at the time of the accident, the Court of Appeals concluded that the primary dispute concerned whether plaintiff’s injury "arose from the use or operation of another vehicle." The provisions of §3106(2) state that accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle if benefits are available under the workers' compensation laws, where an employee sustained injury in the course of his employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle "unless the injury arose from the use or operation of another vehicle."

In reversing the trial court decision in favor of plaintiff, the court held that plaintiff's injury did not result from the actual use or operation of "another vehicle." In so holding, the court interpreted the reference to "vehicle" as synonymous to "motor vehicle," and agreed that a hi-lo was not a motor vehicle. The court also held that this case presented the precise situation the Legislature intended to exclude, that is a work-related injury unrelated to the use or operation of another motor vehicle. Therefore, the trial court decision in favor of plaintiff was reversed.