Attorney General v Automobile Club Insurance Association; (COA-UNP, 10/26/1999; RB #2100)

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Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 212824; Unpublished   
Judges Talbot, Fitzgerald, and Markey; Unanimous; Per Curiam   
Official Michigan Reporter Citation:  Not Applicable; Link to Opinion alt   


STATUTORY INDEXING:   
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]

TOPICAL INDEXING:   
Motor Vehicle Code (Definition of Owner) (MCL 257.37) (MCL 257.401a)    


CASE SUMMARY:    
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals dealt with the definition of "owner" as defined in section 3101 (2)(g)(i) of the No-Fault Act, and held that under this definition, a person need not have exclusive use of a motor vehicle for more than 30 days in order to meet the statutory definition of "owner."

In this regard, the court held:

"An 'owner' is defined as a 'person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.' MCLA 3101(2)(g)(i). Nothing in the plain language of section 3101 (g)(i) requires exclusive use of the vehicle.... The phrase 'having the use' of a motor vehicle for purposes of defining 'owner' under section 3l01(2)(g)(i) means 'using the vehicle in ways that comport with concepts of ownership.'... Here, the documentary evidence presented to the court regarding [the claimant 'sj residency, proprietary interest and use of the vehicle is factually inconsistent. Accordingly, there remains a genuine issue of material fact for resolution at trial, rendering summary disposition of this issue inappropriate."

The court further elaborated that it was inappropriate for the trial court to use the motor vehicle code definition of owner. Although that definition requires exclusive use, it is the no-fault statutory definition of owner which is controlling. In this regard, the court stated in footnote 3:

"The trial court apparently relied on the motor vehicle code's definition of owner. Although the motor vehicle code definition of 'owner' requires exclusive use of the vehicle, MCL 257.37(a); MSA 9.1837(a), this Court has rejected application of the motor vehicle code when interpreting the term 'owner 'for purpose of the no-fault act because the no-fault act defines 'owner.' Auto Owners Ins Co v Hoadley, 201 Mich App 555, 561; 506NW2d595 (1993)."

The court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the claimant was the "owner" of the vehicle. If so, no-fault benefits would not be payable under the uninsured owner disqualification provisions of section 3113(b) of the Act. In that scenario, plaintiff Attorney General would not be able to recoup Medicaid benefits paid to the claimant.